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Recent Decisions
Its reasoning, however, has informed us that four members of the Court
are willing to expand the category of "suspect classification" to include
sex. While the Court's future action is uncertain, increasing pressure
on the judiciary to deal more effectively with sex-based classifications
may induce the Court to adopt strict scrutiny as its standard in dealing
with sex discrimination.
Janice M. Holder
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-VALIDITY OF THE LOCAL PROPERTY TAX FOR
FINANCING EDUCATION-The New Jersey Supreme Court has held that
the local property tax system of financing education does not afford
students the level of education mandated by the state constitution be-
cause it does not guarantee each student an adequate education.
Robinson v. Cahill, 62 N.J. 473, 303 A.2d 273 (1973).
This action was brought by residents, taxpayers, and various municipal
officials, challenging the constitutionality of the New Jersey system of
financing public education.1 The New Jersey Superior Court deter-
mined that the use of the local property tax system for financing educa-
tion discriminated against taxpayers and those students living in dis-
tricts with low property ratables by imposing on them unequal tax bur-
dens. Taxpayers living in different school districts were paying taxes
at different rates in order to finance their school systems. The superior
court held that the discrimination violated the equal protection provi-
sions of the federal and state constitutions.2 The superior court also
held that the system violated state constitutional provisions related to
education and the assessment of real property for taxation." The de-
fendants appealed this decision to the Supreme Court of New Jersey.
The New Jersey system of educational financing derives its funds
from three major sources. The principle portion, 67 per cent of the
state-wide total operating expenditures, is raised through the local ad
valorem taxation of real property.4 State financial aid which consists
1. Robinson v. Cahill, 118 N.J. Super. 223, 287 A2d 187 (L. Div. 1972), rev'd, 62 N.J.
473. 303 A.2d 273 (1973).
2. 118 N.J. Super. at 275, 287 A.2d at 214.
3. Id. at 277, 287 A.2d at 215.
4. Id. at 229, 287 A.2d at 190.
989
Duquesne Law Review Vol. 12: 989, 1974
primarily of "formula aid," 5 transportation aid, school building aid,
and lunch aid, provides another 28 per cent of the total operating ex-
penditures.6 The remaining 5 per cent of the operating budget is pro-
vided through federal aid programs.7
It was agreed that the districts, throughout the state, spent different
amounts per pupil. It was also agreed that the tax base available was
the taxable real property in each district. Another factor considered by
the supreme court was that the available state aid did not operate to
equalize the amount spent per pupil from district to district.$ Finally,
the supreme court proceeded on the presumption that the quality of
educational opportunity depended substantially on the number of dol-
lars invested.9
The supreme court reversed' ° the superior court on its determination
that the educational financing system violated the equal protection pro-
visions of the federal constitution. The plaintiffs had argued that the
"compelling state interest test"" must be applied whenever a funda-
5. Id. "Formula Aid" is the amount that each school district receives from the state
after several factors are considered. First, each district receives equalization aid of $400 per
pupil less its "local fair share" and in any case not less than $75 per pupil. N.J. Rv. STAT.
§ 18A:58-5 (1968). Cities with a population of over 100,000 receive an additional $27 per
pupil. Id. § 18A:58-6.2. "Local fair share" is defined as the amount of revenue that can
be raised by a district with a tax rate of $1.05 per $100 of equalized valuations. Id. §
18A:58-4. The purpose of using equalized valuations is to establish some uniformity in
the distribution of state aid despite unequal assessing practices. Therefore under the pro-
gram each district receives at least $100 per pupil plus the difference, if any, between $325
and the "local fair share." At the time of this action the average statewide expenditure per
pupil was $1,009. See 118 N.J. Super. at 230, 287 A.2d at 189-90. The court also considered
the Bateman Act N.J. REv. STAT. § 18A:58-1-67 (Supp. 1973), enacted October 26, 1970, effec-
tive July 1, 1971, which, when fully funded, will increase state aid for deprived districts
and reduce disparities caused by district wealth variations. Id. The court considered the
Bateman Act separately even though it did have an immediate effect on the above de-
scribed statutory scheme. N.J. REv. STAT. §§ 18A:58-4, 58-5, were amended by the Bateman
Act. Law of 1954, ch. 85, § 6 was repealed by the Bateman Act.
6. 118 N.J. Super. at 231, 287 A.2d at 191.
7. Id. at 245 n.13, 287 A.2d at 198 n.13.
8. 62 N.J. at 481, 303 A.2d at 277.
9. Id. The superior court opinion discusses this correlation at length. 118 N.J. Super.
at 246, 287 A.2d at 199.
10. 62. N.J. at 481, 303 A.2d at 277.
11. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. When a state law is challenged as being violative of
this provision the courts usually look to the reasonableness of the statutory classifications
involved. See Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164, 172 (1972). However, when the
involved classification infringes on a fundamental right, such as the right to vote, or is
based on a suspect criteria, such as race or wealth, a more demanding standard is used.
The involved classification must not only meet the traditional test of reasonableness but
it must be necessary to promote a compelling state interest. See Goosby v. Osser, 409 U.S.
512, 519-20 (1973). In Robinson, the plaintiffs argued that wealth in and of itself is a
suspect criteria and in the alternative that education is a fundamental right. The Supreme
Court, however, has never held that wealth standing alone was a suspect criterion. The
only time that wealth has been deemed to be suspect is when it was used as the basis for
the exercise of a fundamental right. See San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez,
411 U.S. 1, 29 (1973).
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mental right was allegedly violated or when a statutory classification
was based on a suspect criterion such as wealth. The New Jersey Su-
preme Court relied on San Antonio Independent School District v.
Rodriguez2 in deciding to reject the plaintiffs' argument. With respect
to a classification based on wealth, the United States Supreme Court
held that there was no identifiable class against whom the statutory
classification discriminated.'8 The Rodriguez Court also determined
that there is no fundamental right to education 14 and further deter-
mined that to allow the equal protection argument would abrogate the
entire tax base of local government.15 The Supreme Court reasoned
that if the system of local taxation was to be an unconstitutional means
of providing for public education then it might be an equally uncon-
stitutional means to provide other services that are similarly financed.
The conclusion that one must draw is that education is no more funda-
mental than police and fire protection, public health and hospitals, and
various public utilities. The United States Supreme Court in dealing
with this question was also influenced by the concept of federalism.' 6
If the Court had decided that using the local property tax system for
financing education created a statutory classification based on wealth
which violated the fourteenth amendment, the effect would have been
as widespread as Brown v. Board of Education.7 At the time of the
Rodriguez decision there were forty-nine states using the local property
tax system for financing education.' 8
After applying Rodriguez, the New Jersey Supreme Court dealt with
the plaintiffs' contention that the statutory scheme violated the equal
protection provisions of the state constitution.1 9 The supreme court
first recognized that the state constitution could be more demand-
ing than the federal; but, it refused to apply this concept to the ques-
tion of educational financing.20 The court held that there was no classi-
fication based on wealth primarily because educational expenditures
12, 411 U.S. 1 (1973). This case involved an attack on the Texas system of educational
financing. Plaintiffs argued that there was a classification based on wealth and that educa-
tion was a fundamental right, necessitating the use of the compelling state interest test.
13. Id. at 25.
14. Id. at 18. There was a dissenting opinion by Justice Marshall that education should
be deemed a fundamental right because it plays a role essential to the intelligent exercise
of first amendment freedoms and the right to vote. Id. at 70.
15. Id. at 44.
16. Id.
17. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
18. 62 N.J. at 499 n.6a, 303 A.2d at 286 n.6a.
19. Id. at 492, 303 A.2d at 283.
20. Id. at 490-91, 303 A.2d at 282.
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are provided for in the same manner as many other essential services.21
They all depend on the amount the local districts are willing to spend,
and though the amounts spent are limited by the tax base of each dis-
trict, the decision to use real property as a tax base has been one made
by the local districts. The legislature has not mandated that current
expenditures be limited to the amount of taxable real property in each
district.22 The court also refused to accept the argument that education
is a fundamental right.23 The plaintiffs had argued that Brown had
classified education as a fundamental right. The supreme court said
that this was not the case in Brown because the issue there was the in-
vidious classification based on race, and not whether education was a
fundamental right.24 The plaintiffs further argued that if the state de-
cides that a service shall be furnished it should be deemed a funda-
mental right. The court rejected this contention because all services
catagorized as governmental are provided pursuant to a state obliga-
tion.2r The power to tax rests in the state and since municipalities have
no inherent power to tax they do so pursuant to a states' delegation of
its authority.26 To uphold the plaintiffs' argument would mean that all
services provided by local governments would be deemed fundamental,
and the effect would be to drastically change the character of local gov-
ernment. Since the issue before the court did not involve whether local
government as an institution denies equal protection, the court refused
to apply an equal protection analysis only to educational financing.27
The supreme court did, however, concur with the superior court in
its holding that the system of educational financing violated the state
constitution. The New Jersey constitution provides:
The legislature shall provide for the maintenance and support of a
thorough and efficient system of free public schools for the instruc-
tion of all children in this State between the ages of five and
eighteen years. 28
21. Id. at 493, 303 A.2d at 283.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 494, 303 A.2d at 284.
24. The New Jersey Supreme Court cited the United States Supreme Court in Brown
when it said that the issue was: "Does the segregation of children in public schools, solely
on the basis of race, even though the physical facilities and other 'tangible' factors may be
equal, deprive the children of the minority group of equal educational opportunities?" Id.,
citing 347 U.S. at 493.
25. 62 N.J. at 496, 303 A.2d at 285.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. N.J. CONST. art. 8, § 4.
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The supreme court interpreted this section of the constitution to
mean two things. First, it requires that public education be free; and
second, it places the ultimate responsibility of providing a "thorough
and efficient" system of education upon the state.29 The plaintiffs ar-
gued that this provision required equality among taxpayers in the
form of a state-wide tax. The supreme court denied this contention, by
pointing out that the state constitution was amended in 1958 to vest
fiscal responsibility in the local school districts.30 In the alternative,
the plaintiffs had argued that the provision insures equality among the
students in the state and that this equality cannot be achieved by the
present system of taxation that relies heavily on the local tax base for
its revenues. The supreme court qualifiedly agreed.31
Relying on Landis v. Ashworth 32 decided in 1895, the court held
that the legislature had intended that there be an equal educational
opportunity for each child within the intended range of a "thorough
and efficient" system of schools.3 In Landis, the court had defined this
range to be a system, "capable of affording to every child such in-
struction as is necessary to fit it for the ordinary duties of citizenship."
34
The present court defined this standard to be:
. . that educational opportunity which is needed in the con-
temporary setting to equip a child for his role as a citizen and as
a competitor in the labor market.3 5
Neither one of these two definitions is a clear, concrete statement
of what the educational system should provide. In Landis, the court was
dealing with a complaint that some of the districts were providing
secondary school education, while others were not. In 1895 the court
felt that a secondary school education was not necessary in order to
provide a "thorough and efficient" system of schools, and therefore it
was not necessary that each district provide such an education. Today
such a standard could hardly be considered viable. In fact, secondary
school education is part of the free public school system in every state.
Consequently, the supreme court's definition of what a "thorough and
efficient" system means must necessarily be directed at the quality of
29. 62 N.J. at 508-09, 303 A.2d at 291.
30. Id. at 513, 303 A.2d at 294.
31. Id. at 513-14, 303 A.2d at 294-95.
32. 57 N.J.L. 509, 31 A. 1017 (Sup. Ct. 1895).
33. 62 N.J. at 514, 303 A.2d at 294-95.
34. 57 N.J.L. at 512, 31 A. at 1018.
35. 62 N.J. at 515, 303 A.2d at 295.
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the education received rather than the amount of education received.
The issue in this case did not turn on how much education was pro-
vided in terms of the number of years; rather it was that the quality
of education received depended upon the district in which one re-
sided.
After defining the constitutional mandate, the supreme court con-
cluded that the existing statutory system for financing education did
not provide a "thorough and efficient" system of schools. 36 The court
determined this on the basis of dollar discrepancies in the input per
student in the various school districts. The lowest current expense
budget in the state provided $561 per pupil8 7 while at the same time
there were districts whose current expense budgets reflected expen-
ditures of more than $1500 per pupil, per year. 3 The court reasoned
that the existing statutory system could only be meeting the constitu-
tional mandate if the amount spent by the lowest district was enough
to provide a "thorough and efficient" education and that any amounts
spent above that figure were products of a purely voluntary local de-
cision. This, the court said, was highly unlikely in view of the fact
that the legislature had never determined what constituted a "thorough
and efficient" system of education.39 Without such a determination the
local districts were trying to attain an illusory goal.40 Because of the
emphasis placed by both the superior and supreme courts on dollars
spent, one can conclude that in the future the court is going to analyze
the quality of education received by the amount of dollars spent per
pupil.
That a state can constitutionally delegate its responsibility to pro-
vide education was not questioned by the court.41 The court did ques-
tion whether the state, by delegating its responsibility to the local
districts, could in fact provide an educational system that would meet
the requirements of the constitutional mandate. In answering this
question the supreme court said that any system of local taxation would
36. Id.
37. 118 N.J. Super. at 246, 287 A.2d at 199.
38. Id. at 242, 287 A.2d at 197.
39. 62 N.J. at 516, 303 A.2d at 295.
40. Dr. Edward Kilpatrick, Assistant Commissioner in charge of the Division of Admin-
istration and finance, State Department of Education, testified: ". . . that $1200 per pupil
would fund a fine educational program looking at dollars alone." 118 N.J. Super. at 246,
287 A.2d at 199. The superior court found that only 21 per cent of all school districts, con-
taining 17 per cent of the total statewide enrollment, have current expense budgets of $1200
or more. Id.
41. 62 N.J. at 519, 303 A.2d at 297.
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most likely fail because of the disparities that would inevitably arise
from district to district due to the varying size of each district's tax
base.42 The court, however, did not go so far as to say that the expend-
itures in each district must be equal. After the state has provided
for the minimum education necessary to fulfill the constitutional re-
quirements the districts are free to raise additional revenues in order
to provide an even higher standard of education. 43
Robinson is the first state court decision since the United States
Supreme Court decided Rodriguez to invalidate a state educational
financing system. Prior to Rodriguez the trend had been to challenge
educational financing systems on the ground that they violated the
equal protection provisions of the federal constitution 4 4 or through
the vehicle of state equal protection provisions which, since the
Rodriguez decision, would have to be construed as more demanding
than the fourteenth amendment.45 The Rodriguez decision would
seem to preclude a fourteenth amendment attack on educational fi-
nancing systems in the future. The New Jersey Supreme Court chose
not to use the approach of construing state equal protection provisions
as being stricter than those of the federal constitution. 46 Instead it
used a state constitutional provision dealing with education, and de-
clared that there was a certain minimum standard of education
guaranteed to every child in the state. Then, by deciding that certain
districts could not possibly be meeting that standard, the court ordered
the state legislature to guarantee to each child in the state that standard
of education defined as being "thorough and efficient." Furthermore,
by not requiring equalized expenditures throughout the state, the
court recognized that many of the districts have already achieved this
42. Id. at 520, 303 A.2d at 297.
43. Id., 303 A.2d at 298.
44. See Serrano v. Priest, 5 Cal. 3d 584, 487 P.2d 1241, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601 (1971). This
case dealt with an attack, similar to that of the principal case, on the California system
of educational financing. The California Supreme Court decided that the financing system
violated the equal protection provisions of the fourteenth amendment and that equality of
dollar input was necessary.
45. See Miliken v. Green, 389 Mich. 1, 203 N.W.2d 457 (1972). This case involved an
attack on the local property tax as a means of financing education. The court in dealing
with a constitutional provision similar to that of New Jersey determined that the financing
system violated the equal protection provisions of both the federal and state constitutions.
The court said that the financing system failed even under the rational basis test. How-
ever, in light of the Supreme Court's decision in Rodriguez, the Michigan Supreme Court's
rationale as to the fourteenth amendment cannot stand. Therefore, the only basis upon
which the Miliken decision can stand is on the court's determination of the state issues.
This would mean that the state equal protection provision would be more demanding than
the fourteenth amendment.
46. 62 N.J. at 491, 303 A.2d at 282.
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standard, and some have even surpassed it. By not stating that a system
of uniform expenditures was necessary the court allowed the legislature
the opportunity to maintain the higher standards achieved by some
districts. If the court had ruled that equal educational expenditures
were necessary, it would have been saying that unless the dollars spent
by the highest districts provided the minimum standard required by
the constitution those districts with higher spending would have to
lower their standards in order to achieve statewide uniformity. What
the court seems to be attempting to achieve is to raise the quality of
education received throughout the state to some adequate minimum
standard, without, at the same time, lowering the higher quality of ed-
ucation achieved by some of the districts.
The approach used to decide this case can be analogized to the ap-
proach used by the United States Supreme Court in establishing the
right to counsel in criminal cases.47 The Supreme Court in Gideon v.
Wainwright,4 established that indigent defendants had a right to
counsel in state criminal proceedings. In Escobedo v. Illinois,49 the
Court held that any confessions or incriminating statements obtained
from a criminal suspect without advising him of his right to counsel,
and affording him counsel on request, must be excluded from evidence.
Finally, the Supreme Court ruled in Miranda v. Arizona,5° that the
criminal suspect has the right to counsel when taken into custody, and
that he must be advised of that right at that time. The Supreme Court
decided all of these cases using the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment.51 The Court saw this as a question of fundamental rights
at the various stages of the criminal process. The Supreme Court de-
cisions in this area cannot be interpreted to mean that there is a right
to equal counsel, but rather, they must be interpreted to mean that
there exists an equal right to adequate counsel at the various stages
of the criminal process. In essence, the New Jersey Supreme Court is
using the same approach in attempting to solve the problem of educa-
tional financing. It is saying that as a matter of right, under the state
constitution, every child between the ages of five and eighteen is en-
titled to and must receive that education which is necessary for "func-
47. See Kurland, Equal Educational Opportunity: The Limits of Constitutional Juris-
prudence Undefined, 35 U. CI. L. REv. 583 (1966) [hereinafter cited as Kurland].
48. 372 US. 335 (1963).
49. 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
50. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
51. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
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tioning in a contemporary society. ' 52 The court is not saying that there
is a right to an equal education, but rather, that there is an equal right
to an adequate education.
The New Jersey Supreme Court has left the final decision as to what
type of financing system to institute in the hands of the legislature.
At the same time it is forcing the legislature to take some type of ac-
tion. One of the arguments advanced by the defendants was that the
court should defer judgment on this question to the legislature.53
Educational financing is a very complex area, and presumbaly the
legislature has greater access to the information necessary to make this
type of decision. Obviously, both the supreme and superior courts have
rejected this argument, but it would seem that the argument did have
an effect on the supreme court's decision. The court placed almost no
restrictions on the type of schemes available to the legislature in an at-
tempt to meet the constitutional mandate, other than to say that a
system based on the local property tax is unlikely to meet the criteria
of a "thorough and efficient" system of public schools.M Similarly the
United States Supreme Court in Rodriguez ended its decision by em-
phasizing that the legislature is the proper forum to make this type of
decision. 55
By granting the legislature such latitude, the court is recognizing
that a system of equalized expenditures may not take into account the
differences in area costs nor provide the additional dollars necessary
to educate disadvantaged children. 56 There are many variables that
enter into a determination of what the costs of a particular school dis-
trict will be. For example, the area of a district will affect the cost of
transportation.5 7 The number of students in a district may have a
significant impact on the per pupil costs. As the number of students
increases the cost per pupil will decrease until a point of diminishing
52. 62 N.J. at 515, 303 A.2d at 295.
53. 118 N.J. Super. at 229, 287 A.2d at 190.
54. 62 N.J. at 520, 303 A.2d at 297.
55. 411 U.S. at 58. The Court in Rodriguez ended its decision by saying:
The need is apparent for reform in tax systems which may well have relied too long
and too heavily on the local property tax .... These matters merit the continued
attention of the scholars who already have contributed much by their challenges. But
the ultimate solutions must come from the lawmakers and the democratic pressures of
those who elect them.
Id.
56. 62 N.J. at 520, 303 A.2d at 297.
57. 118 N.J. Super. at 237, 287 A.2d at 194. The superior court compared the areas cov-
ered by two school districts. Greater Egg Harbor Regional High School District covers over
339 square miles while the Victoria Gardens District is only 0.14 square miles in area.
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returns is reached. 58 Increasing the number of students will promote
greater efficiency until an optimum level of efficiency is reached. An
additional consideration is the location of a district, which can have
a definite effect on teachers' salaries. Teachers have to be provided in
order to teach in some areas; for those areas teacher costs are likely to
be higher. A system of financing education that required each district
to spend the same number of dollars per pupil may not be flexible
enough to include the above mentioned criteria.
There is one important assumption underlying the Robinson de-
cision. The court accepts the proposition that increased expenditures
will result in an increase in the educational quality of the school dis-
tricts. This may well be true, but there are educators who believe that
there is a point beyond which added dollars will not significantly in-
crease the educational quality of schools.59 There may be other factors
such as environment, family, and social habitat, which play a role in
determining the educational quality of a school district. Racial de-
segregation in and of itself may be a substantial factor in increasing
the educational achievements of students. If all this proves to be the
case, more funds may not be the solution to raising the standard of
education in a particular deficient district.60
Since the United States Supreme Court decided Rodriguez, the use of
the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment is generally
not available as a means of judicially overturning local property tax
systems for financing education. This leaves state judiciaries with two
possible approaches to the problem.
First, the state courts can construie the equal protection provisions
of their state constitutions as being more demanding than those con-
tained in the federal constitution. 61 Any use of equal protection, how-
58. As the number of pupils is increased the cost per pupil decreases. The reason for
this is that the increased number of pupils will be absorbed in the form of larger class
size, and the only additional costs involved will be in the form of materials. However, once
the class size reaches a point beyond which teaching becomes immeasurably more difficult,
the cost per pupil will begin to increase because, in addition to materials, more teachers
and more capital expenditures will be required in order to provide the additional class
space that will be necessary. See R. SLESINGER, BASIC ECONOMICS PROBLEMS PRINCIPLES POLICY
202-09 (1972).
59. The Coleman Report, J.S. COLEMAN, EQUALITY OF EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY 325
(1966), concluded that family background and social composition of the student body are
the primary determinants of achievement in school.
60. See Moynihan, Solving the Equal Educational Opportunity Dilema: Equal Dollars
is not Equal Educational Opportunity, 1972 U. ILL. L.F. 259.
61. The highest court of any state is the final judge of what a state statute or constitu-
tion requires. See West Virginia v. Sims, 341 U.S. 22 (1951).
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ever, does raise certain issues. As pointed out by the Rodriguez Court,
if the local property tax is an impermissible means of financing educa-
tion, then it may well be an equally impermissible means of providing
other essential services. Furthermore, local communities have no in-
herent power to tax. That power rests in the state, and the state dele-
gates it to the municipalities. Because of this, all taxes are state taxes,
and if the equal protection argument is to prevail, every important
service and tax would have to be provided equally on a statewide basis.
Education is important, but, is it more important than health services
or police and fire protection?62 The application of an equal protection
analysis might severely limit the control exercised by local communi-
ties over their own affairs. The control of these services and expendi-
tures would be removed to the state legislatures, far from the local
districts. Finally, the use of an equalized system of expenditures may
have an undesirable social effect. There are three ways in which the
expenditures could be equalized. The state could designate the
amounts spent by the lowest district as being the desirable level of ed-
ucation, and lower the spending of all school districts to that level.
Another approach would be to raise all district spending to what is
currently being spent by the highest spending district in the state. The
approach most likely to be used would be somewhere in the middle,
and would have the effect of raising the educational standards of some
at the expense of others. On the average, this might raise the educa-
tional level of the entire system, but to those whose level of education
is lowered, it would be a system based on mediocrity. 63
State courts, however, do have an alternative to the equal protection
approach. Like the New Jersey Supreme Court, other jurisdictions64
could use specific state constitutional provisions and determine if their
present system of educational financing meets the standards imposed
by the state constitution. The flexibility provided by this approach
allows for changes to be made where they are most necessary. Thus,
62. The California court, in deciding Serrano, did distinguish these services from educa-
tion on the basis that: (1) education is "universally relevant" while every person does not
necessarily use police and fire protection; (2) education is essential for the preservation of
"free enterprise democracy"; and (3) education plays an important role in molding the
youth of society. 5 Cal. 3d at 610, 487 P.2d at 1258-59, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 618-19.
63. See Kurland, supra note 47.
64. At least seven other states have a constitutional provision relating to education
similar to New Jersey's. They are: Delaware, DEL. CONST. art. X, § 1; Georgia, GA. CONST.
art. VIII, ch. 2-6401; Ohio, OHIO CONST. art. VI, § 2; Pennsylvania, PA. CONST. art. III,
§ 14; Texas, TEx. CoNST. art. VII, § 1; Virginia, VA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1; West Virginia, W.
VA. CONST. art. XII, § 1.
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the task of the state legislature in this area becomes one of raising the
educational standards of those receiving substandard educations to a
level where they will be adequately educated, while at the same time
not appreciably lowering the higher educational standards achieved by
others.
Vasilis C. Katsafanas
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-FREEDOM OF SPEECH-COMMERCIAL SPEECH
DOCTRINE-USE OF SEX-DESIGNATED CLASSIFIED ADVERTISING COLUMN
HEADINGS- The Supreme Court has held that a municipal ordinance
construed to forbid sex-designated classified advertising column headings
does not violate newspaper publisher's first amendment rights.
Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Commission on Human Relations,
413 U.S. 376 (1973).
On October 9, 1969, the National Organization for Women, Inc. filed
a complaint with the Pittsburgh Commission on Human Relations al-
leging that the Pittsburgh Press Company had violated the Pittsburgh
Human Relations Ordinance' by the use of sex-designated classified ad-
vertising column headings. 2 After conducting public hearings," the
Commission found the ordinance had been violated by this practice and
issued a cease and desist order.4 On appeal, the commonwealth court
affirmed a modified order.5 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied
review, and the Supreme Court of the United States granted certiorari. 6
1. Pittsburgh, Pa., Ordinance No. 75 § 8(j), Feb. 27, 1967, as amended, Ordinance
395, July 3, 1969, which states:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice .... [f]or any person, whether or not
an employer, employment agency, or labor organization, to aid . . .or participate
in the doing of any act declared to be an unlawful employment practice of this ordi-
nance . . .or to attempt to directly or indirectly oommit any act declared by this
ordinance to be an unlawful employment practice.
2. Prior to October, 1969, the Pittsburgh Press headed its classified advertising col-
umns, "Help Wanted Male," "Help Wanted Female," and "Male-Female Help Wanted."
After the complaint was filed, but prior to judgment, it adopted the designations "Jobs-
Male Interest," "Jobs-Female Interest," "Male-Female." See Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pitts-
burgh Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376, 379-80 (1973).
3. After a complaint is filed with the Commission, public hearings are held pursuant
to Pittsburgh, Pa., Ordinance No. 75 §§ 13(g), (h), (i) Feb. 27, 1967, in order to determine
if the ordinance has been violated.
4. Order of Pittsburgh Commission on Human Relations, July 28, 1970.
5. Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations, 4 Pa. Cmwlth. 448,
287 A.2d 161 (1972). The commonwealth court limited the order of the Commission to
advertising for employment which was not exempt or excluded from the ordinance.
6. 409 U.S. 1036 (1972).
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